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Abstract

Research within the social sciences has attempted to explain what
individuals perceive, why they perceive it the way that they do and what
are their attitudes, intentions and behavior. This issue is at the root of
the contention that surrounds many environmental issues, with
individuals worrying about some risks that dramatically exceed the
danger they actually pose while ignoring others. Moreover, this fact of the
non-rational element in policy decision-making has led researchers to
study how to effectively communicate with a public that is emotionally
driven. Using the 2010 General Social Survey, this paper attempts to reassess the bases of environmental concern and why it matters for public
policy. This paper highlights the significance of social psychological
factors in influencing environmental attitudes, intentions and behavior
and how policy decision makers can benefit through a localized discourse
when communicating risks or formulating public policy.

ii

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank numerous individuals whose support and
guidance were fundamental to the completion of this project. First, to my
faculty advisor, Professor Ron Fernandes, whose encouragement enabled
me to expand and develop my interest of environmental policy into the
behavioral sciences. Moreover, this project could never have been
completed without your guidance in understanding and interpreting my
quantitative analysis. Our long talks, coupled with your critique and
criticisms, were fundamental to the completion of this paper. Next,
Professor Werner DeBondt, whose expertise in the behavioral sciences
expanded my knowledge (and bookshelf) with insights into a field I have
grown to enjoy so much. Next, Professor Joe Schwieterman, whose
thoughtful critiques and guidance were fundamental in the preparation
of this project. I would also like to thank several individuals who I spoke
with in the early stages of this paper: Tom Murray, EPA; Paul Matthai,
EPA; Professor Kelly Tzoumis, DePaul University; and Michael Davidson,
Chaddick Institute for Metropolitan Development. And last but not least,
my family, whose encouragement, support and love provided me with the
focus and direction I needed. I thank you all for your support through
this process.

iii

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ ii
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. iii
List of Tables...................................................................................................................................... iv
List of Figures .....................................................................................................................................v
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1
The Bases of Environmental Concern ............................................................................ 5
Social Structural Influences ............................................................................................................ 6
Social Psychological Influences ...................................................................................................... 8
Theoretical Paradigms ...................................................................................................................... 11
Psychometric Paradigm ...................................................................................................................... 14
Cultural Theory .................................................................................................................................... 21
Regulatory Issues ................................................................................................................................ 25

Empirical Methods ....................................................................................................................... 29
Data and Measures ............................................................................................................................ 29
Behavioral Indicators .......................................................................................................................... 31
Attitudes, Beliefs and Cognitions .................................................................................................... 34
General Worldviews about Humanity and the Environment ................................................. 37
Social Structural Variables ............................................................................................................... 40
Statistical Procedures ....................................................................................................................... 41

Data Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 43
The Effect of Social Structural Variables on Behavior and Intention ....................... 43
The Effect of Social Psychological Variables on Behavior and Intention................. 46
The Effect of Social Structural and Social Psychological Variables on Behavior
and Intention ......................................................................................................................................... 48
The Effect of Social Structural and Postmaterialism on Environmental Beliefs . 51

Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................................................... 53
References........................................................................................................................................... 67
Appendix I: Descriptive Statistics (Social Psychological Variables).... 71
Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics (Behavioral Indicators) ....................... 72
Appendix III: Descriptive Statistics (Social Structural Variables) ........ 73

List of Tables
Table 1- The Effect of Social Structural Variables on Behavior and
Intention................................................................................................................................................. 43
Table 2- The Effect of Social Psychological Variables on Behavior and
Intention................................................................................................................................................. 46
Table 3- The Effect of Social Structural and Social Psychological
Variables on Behavior and Intention.................................................................................. 48
Table 4- The Effect of Social Structural Variables and Postmaterialism on
Environmental Beliefs .................................................................................................................. 51

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1- Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) .................. 13
Figure 2- Judged Frequency of Lethal Events (Lichtenstein et al., 1978) 16
Figure 3- Group/Grid Dimensionality (Schwartz & Thompson, 1990). ..... 23
Figure 4- Technical/Cultural Rationality (Plough & Krimsky, 1987;
p.230) ....................................................................................................................................................... 26

v

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is two-fold: to examine the social
structural and social psychological bases of environmental attitudes,
intentions and behavior in the U.S. in 2010 as well as its influence on
regulatory and policy decision-making. Increasingly, government
decision-makers must understand what individuals perceive, why they
perceive it the way that they do, and what are their attitudes, intentions
and behavior. Moreover, government and experts need to effectively
communicate policy decisions to an emotionally driven public. This
process was articulated succinctly by U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer in his lecture, “Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Toward
Effective Risk Regulation.” Justice Breyer points out how public
perceptions drive the U.S. Congress; Congress enacts guidelines for
regulators and administrators; and regulations guide public perceptions
(Breyer, 1993). Thus, this vicious cycle is underscored by the difficulty of
balancing scientific analysis, political pressures, and an emotionally
driven public in a world of rapidly changing technology and risks.
Moreover, public perceptions are deeply embedded in our governing
mechanisms. This study seeks to identify some of the contributing
factors that influence this process and to make recommendations on how
our governing institutions can more effectively work with citizens to
communicate risk and strengthen environmental policy.
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While this cyclical process may be evident to any individual
familiar with how the American political system ought to work, it does
not fully describe what actually happens. For example, public opinion
polls show that many citizens do not put faith in our elected officials or
governing institutions due to a lack of transparency. Additionally, there
have been group-specific declines in public trust in science (Gauchat,
2012). Therefore, it is ironic that while the public may not trust
government institutions, nor the supporting science, both are seen as the
most responsible for the causes and therefore for solving the problems
(Wildavsky, 1979).
In the environmental field, there exists polarization and contention
about the impact of environmental risks due to the fact that individuals
tend to only respond to those that they can perceive (Slovic et al., 1979).
Moreover, numerous studies have suggested that there is an inherent
gap between individuals’ environmental attitudes, intentions and
behavior, and the influence of internal, external, and situational factors
(Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). Lastly, many past studies have sought to
identify who fears what and why, and in so doing, attempt to understand
in what way our governmental institutions can more effectively assess,
manage, and communicate risk and reward (or cost and benefit)
information to citizens.
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The Human Element
Past literature in cognitive psychology also points to the fact that
the public misperceives many environmental and technological risks.
Many of us are more concerned with some risks than the evidence
warrants (e.g. pesticides, genetically modified foods, nuclear radiation),
and less concerned with risks that pose significant dangers (e.g. climate
change and particulate pollution). Contributing to this perception is
partly due to the fact that individuals rely on judgmental rules, or
heuristics, to reduce what is a difficult mental task into simpler terms.
As such, when fact and values must be balanced, it is usually values
which drive our intentions and behavior.
Likewise, literature in the fields of sociology and anthropology
reveal that individuals use orienting dispositions, or worldviews, to make
sense out of complex information (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). They
posit that mental frameworks are not solely models of individual
cognition, but correspond to deeply held values and beliefs regarding
society, its functioning, and its potential fate. What is evident is that
individuals act within the framework of bounded rationality, making
decisions based on limited information.
The reality of the human element in public policy decision-making
requires acknowledging the limits of public rationality. Moreover,
effective democratic governance is grounded in the transmission of
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information between professionals and the public, known as risk
communication. As the field of risk communication has grown over the
last several decades, this process has evolved into not just the movement
of information, but debate and participation. Therefore, public concerns
and judgments are a fundamental aspect of risk regulation and
environmental policy. However, to what extent is the relationship
between the two groups sufficient? Is the goal to transfer information to
create a more informed citizenry? Should governing institutions not just
inform, but influence, behavior? While the goal of risk communication
seeks to bridge the gap between public and professional risk perception,
its intended purpose remains the same: developing an environmental
ethic that seeks expertise based solutions to mutually defined problems
(O'Leary et al., 1999).
Empirical Analysis
This study will look to further develop insight into the behavioral
and social aspects of environmental concern based on the following: (a)
An empirical analysis examining environmental attitudes, intentions and
behavior in the U.S. in 2010 as a re-assessment of the study by Dietz et
al. (1998) and (b) current regulatory implications based on these
findings. This analysis will seek to further explain the human element in
the regulatory process and further elaborate on the context in which
individuals develop concern for the environment based on the following:
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general worldviews and ideology about humanity and the environment;
specific attitudes, beliefs and cognitions about environmental issues; and
environmentally relevant behavior and intentions. Overall, this analysis
will highlight the growing importance of social psychological factors in
influencing our attitudes, intentions and behavior related to the
environment.

CHAPTER 2: THE BASES OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
Understanding public perceptions and how they influence
intentions and behavior is a fundamental component of effective policy
decision-making. Moreover, understanding how individuals perceive their
own and collective relationship with the environment, evaluate risk and
analyze choices is imperative towards more effective public policy and a
more informed public. This chapter will explain the two main streams of
research that have developed to explain environmental concern: social
structural explanations of environmental concern and social
psychological influences of environmental concern.
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Social Structural Influences
Social structural influences have been examined extensively by
researchers in their connection to environmentalism. Also called sociodemographic variables, these variables represent common structures
between various social positions. These studies share, and have
expanded upon, many common hypotheses about what influences
environmental attitudes, intentions, and behavior.
The strongest predictors of environmental attitudes have been age
and years of education. Studies have suggested that younger individuals
were more likely to have reported engaging in environmental behaviors
than older individuals (Hines et al., 1986). Other studies found that
age/cohort effects are stronger predictors than period effects, with the
more recent cohorts being more environmentally conscious (Kanagy,
Humphrey & Firebaugh, 1994; as cited in Dietz et al., 1998). Likewise,
more years of education led to an increase in knowledge about
environmental issues, yet not to an increase in environmental behavior
(Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002).
Other factors such as race and gender have been less consistent,
but still utilized in several studies. Studies have found that blacks have a
greater concern for the environment than whites relative to other public
issues. However, blacks are less likely to say that they will take political
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action on these issues since many other issues compete for their time
and resources (Mohai, 1990).
The relationship between gender and concern for the environment
has been studied the most extensively in comparison to the other social
structural variables (Stern et al., 1993). Overall, women are generally
found to be more concerned than men. One theory involves aspects of
parenthood (Hamilton, 1985; as cited in Dietz et al., 1998). It is generally
assumed that maternity motivates women to be more conscious of the
harmful effects posed by environmental hazards. Other theories have
included labor force participation and ethical socialization (Blocker &
Eckberg, 1997; Stern et al., 1995). Additionally, studies found that
women usually have less extensive environmental knowledge than men,
but are more emotionally engaged, show more concern about
environmental destruction, believe less in technological solutions, and
are more willing to change their behavior (Lehman, 1999; as cited in
Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). However, other studies have found gender to
have no significant association with environmental attitudes (Hines et al.,
1986).
Religion also has been extensively examined in relation to
environmental attitudes. Most of the research in this area has found a
weak-negative relationship between environmentalism and identity with
a religious sect (Hand & Van Liere, 1984). Political ideology and party
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identification are also associated with social structural influences of
environmental attitudes. Generally, it has been found that the more
liberal and Democratic leaning an individual is, the more likely he or she
is to have increased environment conscious attitudes, and more likely to
engage in environmental intentions and behavior.
Social Psychological Factors
The other stream of research studies has linked environmentalism
to social psychological factors such as attitudes, beliefs, values and
worldviews. These are generally factors related to personality
characteristics, including the perceptions that individuals have of
themselves and others (Hines et al., 1986). Generally, each of these
broad values and attitudes are predictive of specific ones, and that the
most important social psychological factor depends upon the specific
behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
Economic orientation behavior refers to an individual's cost
consciousness and concern about the economic impacts of certain
responsible environmental behaviors and/or regulations (Hines et al.,
1986). Research studies examining willingness-to-pay for public goods
have found that making a personal contribution of money, support for
political action, and rating the importance of a problem are
measurements of how important the issue is to the individual
(Kahneman, 1993). Thus, this subjective preference is often driven by the
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values one associates to that given action. Additionally, willingness-topay is more likely when human, rather than natural harm is the source.
However, when human action is the cause of the problem, intent is
important. For example, intentional harm inflicted by arsonists is more
upsetting than pesticide runoff. Conversely, when the cause of the harm
is natural, surprise is important: unexpected disasters (drought) are
more upsetting than the process of natural decay.
Locus of control represents an individual’s perception of whether
or not he or she has the ability to bring about change through his or her
own behavior. This includes external locus of control – attribute change
to forces beyond yourself – and internal locus of control – believe that
your activities are likely to have an impact. Other internal factors
including motivation, environmental knowledge and awareness, values,
and emotional involvement are frequently referenced in the social
psychological literature.
Motivation, defined as the reason for a behavior or a strong
stimulus around which behavior is organized, is influenced by primary
motives, the larger motives that let us engage in a whole set of behaviors
(e.g. such as altruistic and social values), which are often covered up by
the more immediate, selective motives, that evolve around one’s own
needs (e.g. being comfortable, saving money and time). These motives
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can be influencedby a willingness to act based on knowledge or values,
or are the result of the formation of habit.
Most researchers agree that environmental knowledge is not a
significant predictor of environmental behavior. Likewise, people with
high levels of environmental awareness may not be willing to make bigger
lifestyle sacrifices, but may be more willing to accept political changes
that will enhance pro-environmental behavior such as higher fuel taxes
or more stringent building codes (Diekman & Frazen, 1996; Lehman,
1999; as cited in Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). However, environmental
awareness, which has both a cognitive knowledge base and an affective
perception base, has more predictive ability.
Values shape much of our intrinsic motivation and are
significantly influenced by our immediate social net (Fuherer et al., 1995;
as cited in Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). Emotional involvement is the
extent to which we have an affective relationship with the natural world.
It is seen to be important in shaping our beliefs, values, and attitudes
towards the environment. Moreover, experiential factors including affect,
imagery, and values strongly influence risk perception and support for
environmental policy issues (Leiserowitz, 2006). Other studies have
examined acceptance of postmaterialist values as a means of ideology
(Dunlap & Mertig, 1995, 1997). Postmaterialism is defined as a value
orientation towards self-expression and quality of life over economic and
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physical security. It has generally been found that acceptance of
postmaterialistic values is positively associated with a general concern
for the environment.
Understanding the bases of environmental concern has generally
focused on how social structural - common structures between social
positions - and social psychological variables- how thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors are influenced by others - influence our attitudes,
intentions and behavior. Through the previous research findings,
researchers have established several theoretical frameworks to outline
the process through which these variables operate.
Theoretical Paradigms
Two of the main theoretical paradigms established in the
environmental behavior field include the norm-activation model
(Schwartz, 1977) and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980). The basic premise of the norm-activation model is that moral or
personal norms are direct determinants of pro-social behavior. Normactivation depends on ascription of responsibility to the self for the
undesirable consequences to others. These norms are caused by
cognitive variables (e.g. awareness and knowledge about environmental
problems), emotional (e.g. values and beliefs) and social (e.g. one's own
behavior should will follow social norms). Ultimately, this theory
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emphasizes beliefs about responsibility for causing or ability to alleviate
threats to any valued object.
The other theoretical paradigm, the theory of planned behavior, is
based on the rational evaluation of behavioral consequences and the
normative beliefs concerning the prescription of others (Fig. 1). As such,
attitudes influence behavioral intention, which influences behavior.
Moreover, this theory stresses the importance of situational constraints
when forming behavioral intention. It was found that in order to find a
high correlation between attitude and behavior, the researcher had to
measure the specific attitude toward that particular behavior. For
example, it has been found that measuring ones attitude towards climate
change is a poor predictor of driving habits. A more specific attitude
measurement would lead to a higher correlation, but may lose the
context of what was being asked (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). Moreover,
this theory relied on the assumption that people make systematic use of
information available to them and are not controlled by unconscious
motives or overpowering desire. Ultimately, individuals maximize utility
to balance cost and benefit in their interest. Most researchers followed
this model despite its assumption of rationality since the model was
simple, clear, and provided a mathematical equation for testing.
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Figure 1. Conceptual representation of the Theory of Reasoned Action. As presented in
"Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior" (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).

While both of these models provide insights into pro-environmental
behavior, they fail to account for the fact that people often are greatly
influenced by their cognitive architectures and the complexity of the
environment in which they make decisions (Jones, 2002). As Herbert
Simon states in his book Administrative Behavior, “rationality does not
determine behavior…instead behavior is determined by the irrational and
non-rational elements that bound the area of rationality" (Simon, 1945;
p. 241). Essentially, we are bounded to make decisions based on the
information that we have. In his Behavioral Theory of Choice, Simon
outlines the principles of bounded rationality: A “long term” memory
allows individuals to encode experiences into rules that respond to
stimuli. Similarly, a “short term memory” categorizes features as relevant
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or irrelevant. Next, individuals are significantly driven by emotion, which
enables them to weigh how they respond to stimuli. For example, deeper
concentration and thinking would be used when attention and emotion
are aroused. If not, individuals are likely to rely on heuristics, or other
orienting dispositions, to make sense out of the situation. Most
individuals rely on this quick thinking and processing mechanism rather
than on a deeper processing of evaluating facts and balancing values.
Lastly, emotion enables us to identify with solutions encoded in memory,
which individuals become attached to and thus rely on when faced with
complex decisions.
While this theory only partly explains why individuals behave the
way they do, it further underscores the bases for emotionally driven
behavior under uncertainty. Moreover, this theory highlights the notion
that individuals respond differently to stimuli based on their cognitive
type, thus underscoring how concepts of risk mean different things to
different people.
Psychometric Paradigm
A growing field of literature in cognitive psychology has examined
public risk-perception and decision-making (Slovic, Fischhoff, &
Lichtenstein, 1977; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979; Fischhoff,
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeny, 1981; Slovic, 1987; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). According to Slovic et al. (1977, 1979), their
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empirical testing demonstrated that two main factors influence individual
risk perception: the dread risk factor, which includes factors such as
calm-dread, voluntary-involuntary, controllable-uncontrollable, and
catastrophic-not catastrophic attributes of risks; and the unknown risk
factors, known-unknown to the individual, known-unknown science, and
new-old attributes of risk. Thus, we find risks more acceptable that
present low measures of dread and are more familiar to us. In each of
these cases, the subjective process of balancing our emotion and
cognition allows us to make difficult choices quickly, often ignoring the
facts.
In one of their most well known studies, Slovic et al. (1979)
examined how educated lay people estimated 41 causes of death in the
U.S (Fig 2.). First, while individuals had a good idea of the frequency of
most causes of death, they tended to underestimate the differences in the
likelihood of the most and least frequent causes of death. Likewise, they
overestimated the relative likelihood of those causes of death that are
unusually visible, sensational, and easy to imagine (e.g. homicides and
accidents) (Slovic et al., 1979; Fischoff et al., 1981).
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Figure 2. Relationship between judged frequency and the actual number of deaths per year
for 41 causes of death. If judged and actual deaths were equal, the data would fall on the
straight line. The points, and the curved line fitted to them, represent the average
responses of a large number of lay people. Thus, less frequently occurring risks are
overestimated, and more frequently occurring risks are underestimated. As presented in
"Judged Frequency of Lethal Events” (Lichtenstein et al., 1978).

These causes of death tend to be the hazards that are often most
over reported in the news. Similar findings were found with estimates of
fatalities of various technological hazards (Slovic et al, 1979). Moreover,
these samples have indicated that people often tend to think of
themselves as immune to hazards. For example, they see themselves as
better-than-average drivers, more likely than average to live past 80, less
likely than average to be injured by tools they operate, and so forth
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(Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic, 1987). Other studies have shown that
individuals are roughly 1000 times more likely to accept “voluntary” risks
in comparison to “involuntary” risks. Overall, their findings indicate that
cognitive limitations coupled with anxiety causes uncertainties to be
denied, risks to be distorted, and statements of fact to be believed with
unwarranted confidence.
The significant contribution from the cognitive psychological
literature is that it has provided explanations for judgmental biases.
Moreover, the subjective, instinctive, facts-and-feelings nature of our
perceptions has evolved into emotional cues and cognitive shortcuts. As
a result, individuals rely on judgmental rules, or heuristics, to reduce the
complexity of the issue to terms based on what they heard or observed.
This allows individuals to quickly turn partial information into quick,
easy to imagine choices.
These heuristics include: availability, which enables people to
judge events as likely or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or
recall; overconfidence, people’s insensitivity to the validity of the
assumptions to which their judgments are based; desire for certainty,
people deny uncertainty in dealing with possible gains and losses, thus
representing an additional source of certainty; representiveness,
assessing the degree of similarity, rather than dissimilarity, between two
objects; and anchoring or adjustment, a natural starting place or anchor
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is used as a first approximation to the judgment (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981; Slovic, 1987).
Further studies in the cognitive psychological literature have
examined decision problems, or choice amongst alternatives, that
systematically violate the requirements of consistency and coherence
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This research found that as a result of the
imperfection of human perception, changes of perspective often reverse
the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability of
options. For example, in this study the following question was asked to
152 students:
“Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the
exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the program are as
follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72%)
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be
saved, and 2/3 probability that no one will be saved. (28%)
The majority of choice in this problem is risk adverse. Although the
two programs will save the same amount of people, Program A is more
attractive.
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A second group of students (155 students) were asked a similar
question with a different formulation of the alternative programs:
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. (22%)
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and
2/3 probability that 600 people will die. (78%)
The majority choice in problem 2 is risk taking: the certain death of
400 people is less acceptable then the equal expected value of the 2/3
chance 600 will die. Thus, choices involving gains are often risk averse
and choices involving losses are often risk taking. Moreover, their findings
suggest that decisions are not focused upon final outcomes, but upon
incremental stages in a complex process. As such, what has gone before is
treated as a boundary behind which one ignores.
The practical application of this study's findings are presented in
"Informed Choice or Regulated Risk? Lessons from a Study in Radon
Communication" by Johnson et al. (1988). The authors tested the
assumption that information programs will motivate people to voluntarily
and rationally reduce risks associated with Radon.1 They based this
assumption on the logic that individuals find consent more ethical when
1

Radon causes more cancer deaths per year - 5,000 to 20,000 - than other pollutants
under its jurisdiction. It is a colorless, odorless, gas that occurs naturally. It is
relatively unfamiliar to individuals - both its origins and health risks - and unlike most
environmental hazards, does not have an entity to blame. Due to the fact that most
radon exposure occurs in people's homes, it led EPA to use risk communication
strategies to reduce risk.
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it is actual and explicit (e.g. individual decisions), rather than when it is
implicit or hypothetical (e.g. centralized decisions). However, the authors
argue that ethical issues cannot be avoided when content, format, and
tone of informative messages affect how people understand the
information (p.248). They found that differences in information
treatment do influence learning, formation of risk perceptions, and
intended and recommended behavior, as the previous experiment
suggested. For example, framing outcomes in particular ways to some
individuals may lead to an emotional response signifying loss. Likewise,
the framing of acts and outcomes can also reflect acceptance or rejection
of responsibility for particular consequences (p.256). Ultimately, their
findings indicated that different groups respond to the same message
differently.
Theories of risk perception from a cognitive psychological context
explain the caution individuals and risk communicators should take in
interpreting and presenting information. Moreover, the extent to which
individuals rely on heuristics in their decision-making process has
significant implications for risk communication. However, many of the
choices individuals are faced with are not conducted in research labs like
many of the cognitive psychological experiments previously mentioned.
Moreover, these findings cannot be attributed universally across
individuals or groups. In matters of risk perception, some researchers
argue that we act less as individuals, and more as social beings with
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internalized pressures and delegated decision-making institutions
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Therefore, our values and beliefs are not
individual constructs, but deeply embedded collective mindsets about
society and its functioning. Thus, we choose to live without knowing all
of the risks that we face, following social rules about what to ignore.
Cultural Theory
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), risk is best
understood in terms of the plural social construction of the meaning
attached to the risk, which they have defined as cultural theory. As such,
competing cultures apply different meanings to situations, events,
objects, and relationships. Therefore, individuals are embedded in a
social structure which shapes their values, attitudes, and beliefs (Dake,
1991, 1992).
Cultural theory accounts for the social construction of risk in
terms of three linked domains: cultural biases, shared values and beliefs
that justify a way of behaving; social relations, a pattern of interpersonal
relationships: hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian, fatalists, and
autonomous; and behavioral strategies (Dake 1991,1992). Douglas and
Wildavsky (1982) developed these interpersonal relationships using the
two central dimensions of sociality: control and social commitment (Fig.
3). These relational forms, together with cultural biases, constitute what
is or is not considered a risk. According to Dake (1991, 1992), these
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social constructions of risk can be described in terms of “worldviews”,
which are general attitudes about the world and its social organization.
Each worldview represents a different "rationality"; a set of presuppositions about the ideal nature of society which leads groups to
perceive different risks and policy options (Wildavsky & Dake, 1990).
Moreover, these worldviews serve as orientating dispositions which help
individuals navigate through complex situations.
Four basic worldviews, based on interpersonal relationships, guide
individual attitudes toward social relations: hierarchists, place a great
deal of trust in expertise, dislike social deviance, and maintain the
establishment of structure; they will accept risks as long as decisions
about those risks are justified by experts; individualists, value individual
achievement, support self-regulation, believe people should be rewarded
materially for their achievements, and dislike rules that constrain
individual initiative; they see risks as opportunities; egalitarians, are
distrustful of institutions and their expertise, and see selfishness and
greed as obstacles to a world in which wealth and power should be
widely distributed; they oppose risks that will inflict danger upon many
people or future generations and distrust the advice of a small group of
experts; and fatalists, who see nature as unpredictable and
uncontrollable, and favor isolation and resigned controls on their
behavior; they try not to worry about things that they can do nothing
about (Dake 1991, 1992).
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Figure 3. This chart demonstrates the group (control)/grid (social commitments)
dimensionality to the four basic worldviews. Also, it explains the "myths of nature" each
worldview follows. As presented in "Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology, and
Social Choice" (Schwartz & Thompson, 1990).

Through each of these separate worldviews, perceptions of risk are
identified as a construct, or "rationality", of the socio-cultural context in
which a decision is made. From a public policy perspective,
understanding these patterns of belief is essential to how individuals
perceive the social implications of the risk. For example,
environmentalists may blame "the system" for environmental damage;
corporations may call for market controls (e.g cap-and-trade); or
bureaucratic organizations may call for top-down management
(Thompson et al., 1990, as cited in Dake, 1992). According to cultural
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theory, and in an attempt to explain how environmental risks are
perceived, one must look at the social and cultural context of how that
issue, or risk, is defined.
The cognitive psychological literature attempts to explain the
complex nature of environmental risks, and the difficulty individuals
have in making a "rational" assessment of the multiple dimensions they
present. As such, researchers have established several cognitive
shortcuts individuals take to turn complex information into the quick
choices they make day by day. From a public policy perspective, both
government and experts have attempted to mend this perception gap
through access to education and information under the assumption that
this will enable individuals to make better decisions. However, matters of
who fears what and why are not universal among the public. In
explaining who fears what and why, cultural theory explains how deeply
held beliefs and values about social relations in groups greatly affect
their risk perceptions. As such, researchers have stated that individuals
act less as individuals and more as social beings. They have internalized
social pressures and delegated decision-making processes to institutions,
or any social structure or mechanism governing the behavior of a set of
individuals (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1986; p.80). In contrast to the
cognitive psychological literature which states that individuals are
essentially isolated from social or cultural influences in their use of
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simplifying mechanisms, cultural theory states that these institutions act
as such mechanisms.
Regulatory Issues
Predicting risks requires predictions of events in a world where
many potentially relevant, rapidly changing circumstances entail the
expertise of many different individuals to reach a conclusion (Breyer,
1993). Therefore, government and experts are faced with the
responsibility to bridge the assessment of risks as well as manage a
political discourse around which risks are acceptable to society. As such,
both researchers and professionals have found great difficulty in linking
the social world - "demosphere" - of risk perceptions and the scientist’s
rational, ideal decision-making based in probabilistic thinking "technosphere" (Plough & Krimsky, 1987). For many years, technical
rationality assumed that experts can act independently of popular
culture in structuring risk analysis, whereas cultural knowledge was
assumed to adapt to the rationality of experts. However, regulating risks
in a complex environment with an emotionally charged public continues
to evolve with social, political, and economic changes.
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Technical Rationality
Trust in scientific methods, explanations; evidence appeals to
authority and expertise
Appeal to authority and expertise
Boundaries of analysis are narrow and reductionist
Risks are depersonalized
Emphasis on statistical variation and probability
Appeal to consistency and universiality
Where there is controversy in science, resolution follows status
Those impacts that cannot be uttered are irrelevant

Cultural Rationality
Trust in political cutlure and democratic process
Appeal to folk wisdom, perr groups, and traditions
Boundaries of analysis are broad; include the use of analogy and historical precedent
Risks are personalized
Emphasis on the impacts of risk on the family and community
Focus on particularity; less concerned about consistency of approach
Popular responses to scientific differences do not follow the prestige principle
Unanticipated or unarticulated risks are relevant

Figure 4. This table lists the aspects of technical and cultural rationality in the risk
regulating process. As presented in "The Emergence of Risk Communication Studies: Social
and Political Context" (Plough & Krimsky, 1987; p.230).

Most of the academic literature that examined the regulation of
risk falls into three main categories: Risk management, risk assessment,
and risk communication. In matters dealing with how the public
perceives risk, risk communication has been the field that has bridged
the technical and social aspects of risk. Moreover, it has had significant
influence on how individuals formulate environmental attitudes,
intentions and behavior. Therefore, examining the structural and
psychological bases of environmental attitudes, intentions and behavior
lends to how risk regulators can interact in a society that demands a
voice in the social and political discourse of environmental risks.
As the technical component of the regulatory system, risk
assessment is designed to measure the risk (hazard x exposure)
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associated with the substance. There are four key parts to this process:
Identifying the potential hazard; drawing a dose response curve;
estimating the amount of human exposure; and categorizing the results
(Breyer, 1993). Research over the last several decades has found that
regulatory agencies allocate a great deal of resources to regulate even the
smallest of risks, largely due to the over-reaction of the public. In fact,
the reason U.S. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote his book, "Breaking the
Vicious Cycle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation," was due to the
disputes, uncertainties, and costs associated with the science
surrounding the risk. None the less, the technical aspect of risk
regulation is not free of politics. Once the risk is assessed, regulators
must decide what the assessment reveals, a process known as risk
management. Essentially, this becomes a balance between how the
regulation will diminish one risk, while at the same time produce
attention to different risks.
Therefore, the extent to which risk assessment and risk
management outcomes are relayed to the public is a matter of risk
communication. This aspect of risk regulation informs individuals about
the existence, nature, form, severity, or acceptability of risks (Breyer,
1993). Other definitions include, "an interactive process of exchange of
information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions"
(O'Leary et al., 1990; p.166). Risk communication grew out of the need
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for risk managers to gain public acceptance for their policies guided by
risk assessments.
Its origins can be traced to the height of the nuclear power
industry, which, after risk assessments warranted it as a relatively safe
technology, the lay public grew increasingly suspicious. Experts wanted
to understand why the public did not see the nuclear industry through
their "rational" eyes. Peters and Slovic (1996) found that perceptions of
nuclear energy were largely determined by affect (positive or negative
feelings about specific objects, ideas or images) and cognition. Thus,
what for many experts was deemed “fact” was overshadowed by the
“facts-as-feelings” nature of the public.
The success of risk communication must be measured to some
degree by the extent to which popular attitudes reflect technical
rationality, and the extent to which popular behavior conforms to
technocratic values (Plough & Krimsky, 1987). Therefore, to mend the
discrepancy between technical risk assessment and public perceptions, a
cultural approach must be adapted that bridges expert and public
approaches to a risk event. These approaches can be logical and
coherent on their own terms, but may exhibit differences in how the
problem is articulated with respect to the factors relevant to the analysis,
and who the experts are (Fischhoff et al, 1981).
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CHAPTER THREE: EMPERICAL METHODS
Data and Measures
Through understanding the social structural and social
psychological bases of environmental concern, as well as how risks are
perceived and communicated, the public often displays non-rational
judgment. Moreover, this bias is influenced by the values and beliefs
individuals attribute to the environment. To test the theoretical findings
presented in the previous chapters, this analysis will use the 2010
General Social Survey (GSS) and re-assess the findings in Dietz et al.
(1998) to further illustrate the bases of environmental concern and the
policy implications of these findings.2
The 2010 General Social Survey (GSS) interviewed a random
national sample of 2,044 respondents through the months of February,
March and April of 2010. This data set was used due to its reliability,
replicability, as well as representation of the U.S. population in 2010.
Following the previous study by Dietz et al. (1998), this study excluded
those groups with relatively small numbers. Individuals whose race was
coded as “other” (184 respondents), or who reported religious
denomination other than Protestant, Catholic, or no religion were
excluded from the sample.

2

The Dietz et al. (1998) study tested the social structural and social psychological bases
of environmental concern using data from the 1993 General Social Survey.
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Based on the sample, the General Social Survey included 54 items
in the 2010 environment module which were developed to measure
variables that are connected to the theoretical constructs within the
environmental attitude and behavior literature. These constructs include
social structural as well as social psychological influences on
environmental attitudes, intentions and behavior. Each of these
constructs will be compared separately within tables to control for the
predicative power of each. They will then be combined to examine the
extent to which these associations are maintained. This will allow for the
strength of each theoretical construct to be compared. Additionally, the
effects of social psychological variables within social structural groups
will show the extent to which environmental beliefs are relevant within
social groups.
Items that will be measured include: behavioral indicators
(behavioral intention and past behavior); attitudes, beliefs, and
cognitions; general worldviews about humanity and the environment;
and social-structural items. These items were linked following a principal
component analysis to determine the dimensionality of each group. This
method reduced the number of predictor variables to a smaller number
of dimensions. After rotating the factors using a varimax rotation, the
factors determined the structure of each group. Those items with a factor
loading above .40 were used to create the appropriate scales. The scales
that were constructed followed those used in the Dietz et al. (1998) study
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and look to re-assess the extent to which these theoretical constructs are
conceptually representative and maintained in the 2010 U.S. population.
Behavioral Indicators
Behavioral Indicators

Definition

Mean

S.D.

N

Willingness to Sacrifice (WTS)1

How willing are you to make
personal sacrifices for
environmental quality?

2.84

1.08

1302

Consumer Behavior (CB)2

How often do you use products or
services which are
environmentally friendly?

2.19

0.65

1252

Sign a Petition on Environmental Issue (SP)3

In the last five years, have you
signed a petition on an
environmental issue?

0.17

0.37

1381

Member of Environmental Group (GG)3

Are you a member of any group
whose aim is to preserve or
protect the environment?

0.06

0.23

1400

Environmental Spending (ES)4

Do you think we are spending too
much, too little, or the right
amount on improving and
protecting the environment?

2.44

0.71

960

Protect the Environment (PE)5

Do you think government should
have a role in deciding how
people/business protect the
environment?

0.75

0.35

984

1Scale

range from
range from
3Scale range from
4Scale range from
5Scale range from
2Scale

1 (not willing at all) to 5 (very willing)
1 (never) to 4 (always)
0 (no) to 1 (yes)
1 (too much) to 3 (too little)
0 (government let people/business decide) to 1 (government should pass laws)

The 2010 GSS environment module contained 13 questions
focused on past behavior and intention. Two of the questions in this
category were not included: if the respondent had participated in a
demonstration about an environmental issue; and if the respondent had
given money to an environmental group. The former was omitted based

31

on the analysis by Dietz et al. (1998) which questioned the validity of the
item. The latter was omitted due to the low number of respondents (258).
Based on the remaining 11 questions, factor analysis sorted the items
into the following categories: willingness to sacrifice (WTS), consumer
behavior (CB), and political/collective behavior (SP and GG).
Each of these items was recoded so that a positive score reflects a
pro-environmental position. The collective or political behavior category
had low alpha reliability (.420), so each item was analyzed separately.
These items asked respondents whether they are a member of a green
group (GG) and if they had signed a petition on an environmental issue
(SP). The WTS and CB scales, as well as the alpha loadings, are provided
in the appendix. Some respondents indicated within the CB items that
they did not have access to certain products or services. These
respondents were omitted from the scale along with those who responded
“don’t know.”
Two additional items were analyzed on government environmental
spending (ES) and role of government in environmental protection (PE).
The item on ES was a split ballot experiment and only one ballot
measure was analyzed, thus the lower sample size relative to the other
items tested. This item asked respondents if government is spending too
much, too little, or just the right amount on improving and protecting the
environment. Additionally, the measure on role of government in
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environmental protection (PE) provides further examination of
respondent’s political behavior. These two variables, one in regards to
“business”, the other “people”, asked respondents, “If you had to choose,
which one of the following would be closest to your views? Government
should let (people/business) decide for themselves how to protect the
environment, even if it means they don’t always do the right thing, or
government should pass laws to make (people/business) protect the
environment, even if it interferes with (people/business) rights to make
their own decisions.” These two questions were combined to create a new
item where a higher score represented a pro-law position. Not only does
this question cover the balance between the state and the individual, but
it provides further explanatory power beyond the environmental spending
item. Lastly, all of the categories are separated between past behaviors
(CB, GG and SP) and behavioral intentions (WTS, ES, and EP).
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Attitudes, Beliefs, and Cognitions
Attitudes, Beliefs and Cognitions

Definition

Mean

S.D.

N

Awareness of Consequences (AOC)1

Do you believe these activities have
negative consequences for the
environment?

3.66

0.69

1216

Locus of Control (Internal) (LCI)2

It is just too difficult for someone like me
to do something about the environment.

3.52

1.12

1362

Locus of Control (External) (LCE)2

There is no point in doing what I can for
the environment unless others do the
same.

3.43

1.13

1379

Know Solution (KS)3

How much do you feel you know about the
solutions of environmental problems?

2.52

1.02

1357

Know Cause (KC)3

How much do you feel you know about the
causes of environmental problems?

2.94

1.07

1359

1

Scale range from 1 (not dangerous at all for the environment) to 5 (very dangerous for the environment)
Scale range from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
3
Scale range from 1(know nothing at all) to 5 (know a great deal)
2

The GSS consisted of 10 attitude, belief, and cognition items of
which six were used in the factor analysis. These items created a six
variable scale with an alpha reliability of .806 (see appendix). These
questions looked at whether six kinds of environmental activities have
negative consequences for the environment. The scale was recoded so
that higher scoresrepresented belief in greater awareness of
consequences (AOC). Beliefs about the consequences of such activities
have been identified as strong predictors of environmental behavior.
Studies including Schwartz’s (1977) theory of moral norm activation as
well as Dunlap & Van Liere’s (1978) new ecological paradigm measured
these items relative to environmental concern.
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This block also included measures of internal (LCI) and external
(LCE) locus of control. These items represent an individual’s perception
of whether he or she has the ability to bring changes through their own
behavior. Individuals with a strong LCI believe that their actions can
bring about change. People with a strong LCE feel that their actions are
insignificant, and feel that change can only be brought about by others.
LCI was measured based on the question “it is just too difficult for
someone like me to do something about the environment.” The response
was based on a 5-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.
LCE was measured based on the question “there is no point in doing
what I can for the environment unless others do the same.” The response
was based on a 5-point scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”
(see appendix). In both variables, a higher score represented a proenvironmental position, signifying that they have the ability to do
something about the environment.
Also included was a measure of environmental knowledge and
awareness. In the study by Hines et al. (1987), their meta-analysis of
environmental behavior indicated knowledge of issues and knowledge of
action strategies as primary indicators of environmental attitudes,
intentions and behavior. Two aspects of knowledge were measured: how
much the respondent knows about the cause of environmental problems
(KC) and how much the respondent knows about solutions (KS) to
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environmental problems.3 To measure KC, the question was used, “how
much do you feel you know about the causes of these sort of
environmental problems? Answers were based on a 5-point scale,
ranging from “know nothing at all” to “knowing a great deal.” To measure
KS, the questions asked, “how much do you feel you know about
solutions to these sort of environmental problems?” Answers were based
on a 5-point scale, ranging from “know nothing at all” to “knowing a
great deal.” Cause and solution were included separately since they each
have a predictive ability towards behavior. For example, given high levels
of knowledge about the causes of environmental problems, an individual
may be more likely to strengthen their environmental behavior to offset
possible risks, or conversely, individuals will decrease their
environmental behavior if they are certain on the causes of
environmental problems, thus realizing there is little they can do.
Additionally, Kollmus and Agyeman (2002) state that an increase in
environmental awareness leads to individuals being less likely to make
bigger lifestyle sacrifices, but more willing to accept political changes that
will enhance pro-environmental behavior. This logic follows with
knowing solutions to environmental problems as well.4

3These

environmental problems include: air pollution, chemicals and pesticides, water
shortage, water pollution, nuclear waste, domestic waste disposal, climate change,
genetically modified food, and using up our natural resources.
4

The correlations between KC and KS do not fully support this hypothesis. WTS
(B=.227, B=.190, respectively) and CB (B=.242, B=.222, respectively) – both larger
lifestyle sacrifices – show stronger positive correlations then GG (B=.113, B=.097,
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General Worldview and Ideology about Humanity and the Environment
General Worldview and Ideology about
Humanity and the Environment

Definition

Mean

S.D.

N

1.19

1373

Progress versus the Environment (PB)1

Trade-offs between
progress or economic
growth and the
environment.

2.95

Fragility of Nature (FB)1

Human interaction with
natural environment.

2.87

0.79

1328

Postmaterialism (PM)2

Value orientation
towards self-expression
and quality of life over
economic and physical
security.

1.52

0.99

1166

1

Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
Scale range from 0 (none of America's priorities should be postmaterialistic values) to 3 (America's
highest priorities should be postmaterialistic values)
2

The General Social Survey contained five items which were used to
judge general ideas about the nature of human-environment
relationships. Through factor analysis, two categories were created:
whether economic progress is environmentally harmful (PB), whether
human activity is harmful to the environment (FB) and post materialism
(PM). The first category was “progress vs. environment” (PB) which had
an alpha reliability of .621. Some studies found that belief in growth
influences individuals to be less inclined to make personal sacrifices
(Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002). The item was coded so that a higher score

respectively), ES (B=.084, B=.074, respectively), and PE (B=.145, B=.099, respectively) –
all of which are larger political changes that will enhance behavior. SP (B=.214, B=.205,
respectively) is the only political change that is correlated to a similar strength as larger
lifestyle and sacrifices.
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represents a pro-environmental position. The other factor represented
respondents view about human interaction with the environment. This
was interpreted as representing “fragility of nature” (FB) beliefs. This
factor had an alpha reliability of .516. This item was recoded so that
higher scores represent a pro-environmental position. Both of these
factors are theoretically linked to cultural theory (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982; Dake, 1991, 1992). Scales and factor loadings for both of these
categories are included in the appendix.
The first factor, “progress vs. environment” (PB), conforms to the
individualist belief that market forces will overcome environmental
consequences. Moreover, this item is indicative of the current discourse
around environmental issues. The second factor, “fragility of nature”
(FB), shares with the first key myths of nature identified in the cultural
theory of risk. This position is common with egalitarians, representing
high levels of concern about environmental risk, and also increased
participation in environmental movement organizations (Dake, 1992).5
Another item that was measured and is also a measurement of
ideology or worldview is post-materialism (PM). This item is established
throughout the environmental behavior literature as a justification for
environmental concern (Dunlap & Mertig, 1997). The question in the
5

The correlation between FB and AOC was a statistically significant moderate-positive
relationship (B=.373). However, the correlation between FB and GG was a non
statistically significant weak-negative relationship (B= -.015).
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GSS asked respondents to choose “the one thing you think should be
America’s highest priority, the most important thing it should do.
America should: (1) Maintain order in the nation; (2) give people more say
in government decisions; (3) fight rising prices; (4) protect freedom of
speech.” Following this question, there was a second question that asked
respondents to choose the second most important item from the same
list. The second and the fourth item were both considered postmaterialist values, while the first and the third are materialist. A scale
was created by assigning two points if a post-materialist item was
selected as a top priority and one point if it was given second priority,
creating a scale 0-3. Therefore, a higher score yields stronger postmaterialist values.
Social Structural Variables
The General Social Survey contained several variables to test the
social structural influences of environmental attitudes, intentions and
behavior. Variables including gender, race, age, income, and religion
were recoded using dummy variables. In each item, the larger variable
was used as the reference category. Gender was recoded as (1=Female)
and race was recoded as (1=Black). Age was recoded to include three
groups: Baby-boomers (between the ages of 45-65); Generation X
(between the ages of 30-44); and Generation Y (<30 years old). Income
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was recoded by using the median income of respondents ($50,000) as a
midpoint (1=Below median income).
Also included were measures for education, political ideology, and
party identification. Education was a linear measure of years of
education (0-20). Political Ideology was measured using a 7-point scale
from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. This variable was
recoded so that higher scores represented a more liberal position. Due to
the findings that suggest liberals are more likely to show higher levels of
concern for the environment, and following the structure of Dietz et al.
(1998), this item was renamed liberalism. Party identification was used
to assess which political party the respondent identified with. Three
dummy variables were created: (1=Democrat); (1= Republican); and
(1=Independent).
Variables for religion, religious strength, and spirituality were also
used. Religion was recoded into dummy variables for the three most
prominent denominations: (1=Protestant); (1=Catholic); and (1=No
Religion). A measure of religious strength was also included based on the
question “would you call yourself a strong….or not a very strong…?” The
variable was recoded so that those that responded “strong” were coded 3,
those responding “somewhat strong” were recoded 2, and those
responding “not very strong” were recoded as 1. Individuals with no
religious affiliation were recoded as 0. A measure of spirituality was also

40

measured using the question, “to what extent do you consider yourself a
spiritual person?” The question consisted of a 4-point scale from “very
spiritual” to “not spiritual at all.” This item was recoded so that higher
scores represent a more spiritual person.
Statistical Procedures
Ordered logistic regression (OLR) and bivariate logistic regression
(BLR) was used to determine the predictive ability of the independent
variables on the dependent variable. Both look to predict the change in
the dependent variable for a unit change in the independent variable.
OLR allows for the relative importance - logit regression coefficient - of
the independent variable to be identified. BLR uses odds-ratios since the
variable is dichotomous.
Other than SP and GG, all variables were tested using OLR. SP
and GG were tested using BLR. For this analysis, there was not a need
for standardized estimates since only statistical effects across columns
were analyzed.
Also, the analysis consists of examining the coefficient of multiple
determinations (Cox and Snell pseudo R2 for OLR and BLR). Similar to
the R2 in OLS regression, this attempts to measure the percentage of
total variation in the dependent variables that is explained by the
variation in all the independent variables. This study follows the
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understanding that environmental data is often skewed, as well as the
fact that Dietz et al. (1998) did not find substantial differences in the
results when outliers were deleted.6 Additionally, sample sizes for each of
the variables and indexes vary due to the recoding techniques.

6

Individuals who are surveyed one-on-one have a tendency to exaggerate their
environmental attitudes and behavior to conform to norm expectations.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS
Table 1
The Effect of Social Structural Variables on Behavior and Intention
Willingness
to Sacrifice
(WTS)

Consumer
Behavior
(CB)

Male
Female

0.00
-0.03

0.00
0.17*

Black
White

-0.20*
0.00

Baby Boomers
Generation X
Generation Y
Income
Above Median
Income
Below Median
Income
Education

Sign
Petition
(SP)

Member
of Group
(GG)

Environmental
Spending
(ES)

Protecting the
Environment
(PE)

0.00
0.55**

0.00
0.72

0.00
0.04

0.00
0.03

-0.25*
0.00

0.53*
0.00

0.35
0.00

-0.34*
0.00

-0.09
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.07

0.00
-0.17*
-0.22*

0.00
0.63*
1.10

0.00
1.11
0.78

0.00
0.08
0.17

0.00
-0.16
-0.30*

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

-0.01

0.10

0.57**

0.38*

-0.01

0.04

0.05**

0.04**

1.16**

1.11

0.02

0.06**

0.07*

0.10*

1.32**

1.55**

0.07

0.07

Gender

Race

Age

Liberalism
Party Identification
Democrat
Independent
Republican

0.06
0.00
-0.12**

0.04
0.00
-0.03

1.19
0.00
1.05

0.97
0.00
1.13

0.10
0.00
-0.16*

0.13*
0.00
-0.10

0.00
0.05
0.34
-0.01
0.08
.10

0.00
0.26**
0.21
0.03
0.12**
.09

0.00
1.31
1.15
0.84
1.39**
.10

0.00
0.80
0.32
0.62
1.50*
.04

0.00
-0.05
0.02
-0.06
0.05
.07

0.00
0.13
0.20
0.05
-0.05
.09

Religion
Protestant
Catholic
No Religion
Religious Strength
Spiritual Person
R2
N

835

817

868

879

599

633

Note: WTS, CB, ES and PE are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients. SP and GG are
interpreted as odds-ratios.
*p<.10, **p<.05
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In Table 1, the pseudo R2 of each dependent variable indicates that
there remains significant explanatory power for behavioral intentions
beyond the social structural variables.7 The findings from this table
highlight the following insights into the effect of social structural
variables on behavior and intention:


Education and Liberalism tend to be the strongest predictors of
environmental behavior and intentions.



Religion and Religious strength is a weak predictor of
environmental behavior and intention. However, an individual’s
level of spirituality is a stronger predictor of past behavioral items.

This set of variables explains (pseudo R2) between 4% and 10% of the
variation in behavior and intention. Gender is related to CB and SP, with
females more likely than males to engage in CB, but less likely than
males to SP. Race shows a statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP and ES with
blacks being less likely than whites to engage in each of these behavior
and intentions.
Age cohort shows a statistical effect on CB, SP and PE. Generation X
(30-44) and Generation Y (< 30 years old) respondents are less likely to
engage in CB than Baby Boomers (45-65). Generation X (30-44)

7

This is also due to the fact that anytime the dependent variable is a range of integers,
R2 statistics are relatively low.
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respondents are less likely than Baby Boomers (45-65) to SP; and
Generation Y (< 30 years old) respondents are less likely to believe
government should pass laws for individuals and businesses to protect
the environment (PE).
Income shows a statistical effect on SP and GG - both public
behaviors. Below median income individuals are less likely than above
median income individuals to engage in these past behaviors. It would
seem that income would show a statistical effect on WTS and/or CB
items. However, being that income is associated with political and/or
collective groups implies further insight into the context in which these
organizations target the public.
Both education and liberalism are two of the strongest predictors
among behavior and intentions. The more educated the respondent, the
more likely they are to show a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP
and PE. The more liberal the respondent, the more likely they are to
show a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP and GG.
Religion in this block only shows a statistical effect on CB, with
Catholics more likely to engage in this behavior than Protestants.
Religious strength does not show a statistically significant effect on any
of the behavior or intention items mentioned.8 The item which measured

8

Religion and Religious Strength have a high correlation among Protestant (B=.512) and
No Religion (B=-.864). Due to the high correlation, this may weaken the statistical
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spirituality shows a positive statistical effect on CB, SP and GG. Lastly,
party identification shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, ES and PE,
with Republicans less likely than Independents to engage in WTS and
ES. Democrats are found more likely than Independents to believe
government should pass laws for businesses and individuals to protect
the environment (PE).9
Table 2
The Effect of Social Psychological Variables on Behavior and
Intention
Willingness
to Sacrifice
(WTS)

Postmaterialism (PM)
Awareness of Consequences (AOC)
Progress Beliefs (PB)
Fragility Beliefs (FB)
Locus of Control (Internal) (LCI)
Locus of Control (External) (LCE)
Know Cause (KC)
Know Solution (KS)
R2
N

-0.01
0.40**
0.24**
0.19**
0.06
0.07*
0.11**
0.07
.24
950

Consumer
Behavior
(CB)

-0.01
0.50**
0.04
0.00
0.06
0.05
0.09*
0.13**
.17
906

Sign
Petition
(SP)

1.28**
1.39**
1.32**
0.82
1.33**
1.14
1.37**
1.20
.11
969

Member
of Group
(GG)

Environmental
Spending
(ES)

Protecting the
Environment
(PE)

1.23
1.16
1.32*
0.95
1.20
1.10
1.08
1.28
.03

-0.06
0.55**
0.32**
0.04
0.10
-0.06
0.00
0.05
.20

-0.19**
0.30**
0.27**
0.10
0.12*
0.04
0.06
0.08
.18

981

507

746

Note: WTS, CB, ES and PE are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients. SP and GG are
interpreted as odds-ratios.
*p<.10, **p<.05

significance of these variables. Additionally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) indicated
that No Religion and Religious Strength may pose multicollineartiy (Tolerance of .197
and .201, respectively). As such, removing religious sects from the analysis would show
that religious strength is statistically significant, and vice-versa.
9

Party Identification and Political Ideology have a high correlation among Democrats
(B=.426) and Republicans (B=-.465). Due to the high correlation, this may weaken the
statistical significance of these variables. However, the variance inflation factor (VIF)
indicated that multicollineraity is not a problem.
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In Table 2, the pseudo R2 is significantly higher than Table 1,
indicating the influence of social psychological variables on behavior and
intention. The social psychological items tend to predict more in regards
to behavioral intention (WTS, ES and PE) than in past behavior (CB, SP
and GG). The findings from the table highlight the following insights:


Both AOC and PB are strong predictors of behavior and intention.

This set of variables accounts for 3%-24% of the variance in
behavioral indicators. PM shows a statistical effect on SP and PE, with
respondents indicating PM values more likely to SP, but less likely to
believe government should pass laws to protect the environment (PE).
AOC shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, SP, ES and PE. PB
shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, SP, GG, ES and PE. FB shows
a positive statistical effect on WTS. LCI shows a positive statistical effect
on SP and PE. LCE shows a positive statistical effect on WTS.10 KC
shows a positive statistical effect on WTS, CB, and SP. KS only shows a
positive statistical effect on CB.11

10

LCI and LCE have a high correlation (B=.472). Due to this high correlation, this may
weaken the statistical significance of these variables. However, the variance inflation
factor (VIF) indicated that multicollinearity is not a problem.
11Know

cause of environmental issues (KC) and know solution of environmental issues
(KS) have a high degree of correlation (B=.631). Due to this high correlation this may
weaken the statistical significance of these variables. However, the variance inflation
factor (VIF) indicated that multicollinearity is not a problem.
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Table 3
The Effect of Social Structural and Social Psychological Variables on
Behavior and Intention
Willingness
to
Sacrifice
(WTS)

Consumer
Behavior
(CB)

Sign
Petition
(SP)

Member
of
Group
(GG)

Environmental
Spending
(ES)

Protect the
Environment
(PE)

Male
Female

0.00
-0.05

0.00
0.18*

0.00
0.55*

0.00
0.90

0.00
0.11

0.00
-0.09

Black
White

-0.07
0.00

-0.05
0.00

1.09
0.00

0.71
0.00

0.11
0.00

0.13
0.00

Baby Boomers
Generation X
Generation Y
Income
Above Median
Below Median
Education
Liberalism
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
No Religion
Religious Strength
Party Identification
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Postmaterialism
(PM)
Awareness of
Consequences
(AOC)
Progress Beliefs
(PB)
Fragility Beliefs
(FB)
Locus of Control
(Internal) (LCI)
Locus of Control
(External) (LCE)
Know Cause (KC)
Know Solution (KS)
R2
N

0.00
-0.02
0.13

0.00
-0.26**
-0.20

0.00
0.74
1.57

0.00
1.31
1.09

0.00
-0.04
0.24

0.00
-0.17
-0.24

0.00
-0.04
0.04*
0.01

0.00
0.09
0.03
0.03

0.00
0.75
1.11*
1.28*

0.00
0.46
1.05
1.46*

0.00
-0.03
-0.05
0.08

0.00
0.18
0.03
0.10

0.00
-0.05
0.19
-0.01

0.00
0.21*
0.14
0.08

0.00
1.47
0.71
0.75

0.00
0.94
0.23
0.58

0.00
-0.07
0.76*
0.17

0.00
0.15
-0.08
0.06

0.04
0.00
-0.10
0.00

-0.01
0.00
-0.02
-0.02

1.07
0.00
1.06
1.31*

0.80
0.00
0.95
1.13

-0.09
0.00
-0.20*
-0.04

0.02
0.00
-0.10
-0.23**

0.45**

0.49**

1.55*

1.17

0.47**

0.20

0.24**

0.02

1.15

1.19

0.34**

0.25**

0.21**

0.06

0.90

1.29

-0.06

0.03

0.11**

1.47**

1.51

0.12

0.11*

0.02

1.15

1.09

-0.09

0.07

1.15
1.17
.06
654

0.13
-0.09
.24

0.09
0.07
.23

Gender

Race

Age

0.14*
0.02
.31
636

0.12*
0.11
.21
618

1.12
1.39*
.17
646

48

323

0.07
0.20**

491

Note: WTS, CB, ES and PE are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients. SP and GG are
interpreted as odds-ratios.
*p<.10,** p<.05

In Table 3, controlling for both the social structural and social
psychological variables adds a significant amount of predictive strength
to the behavior and intention items. However, these two groups explain
behavioral intention more so than past behavior. Some interesting
highlights from this table include:


Social psychological variables are stronger predictors of behavior
and intention.

These variables explain between 6%-31% of the variance in behavior
indicators. Social psychological variables added an additional 2%-19% of
variance to the social structural items for behavioral indicators. Race in
this table is not predictive of any items regarding behavior and intention.
Gender only shows a positive statistical effect on SP, in which females
are less likely than males to engage in this behavior. Age only shows a
positive statistical effect on CB in which Generation X (30-44)
respondents are less likely than Baby Boomers (45-65) to engage in
environmental behaviors. Income does not show any statistical effect on
the behavioral indicators. Education shows a positive statistical effect on
WTS and SP. Liberalism shows a positive statistical effect on SP and GG.
Religion shows a positive statistical effect on CB and ES. Catholics are
found more likely than Protestants to engage in CB, while those who
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identified with No Religion are more likely than Protestants to believe we
are not spending enough on the environment (ES). Religious strength
and spiritual person do not show any statistical effect on the behavioral
indicators. Party identification only shows a statistical effect on ES, in
which Republicans are less likely than Independents to think the
government is spending not enough money on the environment (ES). PM
shows a positive statistical effect on SP and PE, with respondents
indicating they are PM more likely to SP, but less likely to believe
government should pass laws for people and business to protect the
environment (PE). AOC shows a positive statistical effect on all behavior
and intentions except GG. PB shows a positive statistical effect on WTS,
ES and PE. FB only shows a positive statistical effect on WTS. LCI shows
a statistical effect on CB, SP and PE. LCE only shows a positive
statistical effect on WTS. KC shows a positive statistical effect on WTS
and CB. KS only shows a positive statistical effect on SP.
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Table 4
The Effect of Social Structural and Postmaterialism on
Environmental Beliefs
Awareness of
Consequences
(AOC)

Religious Strength
Spiritual Person
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
No Religion
Race
Black
White
Gender
Male
Female
Age
Baby Boomers
Generation X
Generation Y
Income
Above Median
Below Median
Education
Liberalism
Party Identification
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Postmaterialism (PM)
R2
N

Fragility
Beliefs
(FB)

Progress
Beliefs
(PB)

-0.14
0.27**

-0.06
0.05

-0.14
-0.06

0.00
0.16
0.12

0.00
0.38*
0.64

0.00
0.29
0.02

0.19
0.00

0.82**
0.00

Locus of
Control
(External)
(LCE)

Know
Cause
(KC)

Know
Solution
(KS)

0.01
0.25**

-0.03
0.20*

0.06
0.13

-0.10
0.15

0.00
-0.21
0.34

0.00
-0.10
0.02

0.00
-0.08
0.35

0.00
0.22
0.19

-0.76**
0.00

-0.46*
0.00

-0.68**
0.00

-0.27
0.00

0.00
0.38**

0.00
-0.04

0.00
0.18

0.00
0.25

0.00
0.11

0.00
-0.77**

0.00
-0.43**

0.00
0.14
0.09

0.00
0.25
0.07

0.00
0.02
0.13

0.00
0.00
0.02

0.00
0.38**
-0.08**
0.21**

0.00
0.40**
-0.09**
0.16**

0.00
-0.18
0.15**
0.20**

0.00
-0.45**
0.19**
0.06

0.30**
0.00
-0.14

0.00
0.00
-0.01

0.18*
0.00
-0.08

0.05
0.00
0.03

0.00
-0.02
-0.21

-0.10
.19
682

-0.07
.12
730

-0.94**
0.00

0.14*
.17
747

Locus of
Control
(Internal)
(LCI)

0.16*
.16
745

0.00
-0.02
0.14**
-0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.00
0.14*
.08
751

0.00
0.17
0.11

0.00
0.29
0.28

0.00
-0.24
0.13**
0.13

0.00
0.02
0.13**
0.07

0.22**
0.00
0.20*

0.08
0.00
0.19*

0.17*
.14
743

0.15*
.09
745

Note: AOC, FB, PB, LCI, LCE, KC and KS are interpreted as unstandardized logit regression coefficients.
*p<.10,** p<.05

In Table 4, environmental beliefs are used as the dependent
variable to determine their predictive ability given social structural items
and postmaterialism (PM). Some highlights from this table include the
following:
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Education tends to be the most statistically significant predictor of
environmental beliefs



Age is a poor predictor of environmental beliefs.
Social structural items and postmaterialism account for between

8%-19% of the variance in environmental beliefs. In this table, religious
strength does not show any statistical effect on environmental beliefs.
Religion only shows a statistical effect on FB, with Catholics more likely
to hold FB than Protestants. This may contribute to the finding that
Catholics are more likely than Protestants to engage in CB. Religious
strength does not show a statistical effect on any of the environmental
beliefs. However, those respondents indicating they are a spiritual person
are associated with three of the environmental beliefs: AOC, LCI and
LCE. Race is astrong predictor of environmental beliefs, although the
results are not consistent. Blacks are more likely than whites to hold FB,
however, they are less likely than whites to show a positive statistical
association with PB, LCI or KC. Gender also does not tell a complete
story, with females more likely than males to hold a high AOC, yet less
likely to hold KC or KS. However, this follows the findings in the past
literature that on average women tend to be more concerned about the
environment, yet know less about the causes and solutions to
environmental issues. Age cohort turns out to be a poor predictor of
environmental beliefs, showing no statistical effects. Income shows a
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statistical effect on three of the environmental beliefs. Below median
income individuals are more likely than higher income individuals to
have an increased AOC and FB, yet are less likely to display LCI. Further
insight to this finding could be due to the workplace environment or
living environment of individuals. Education is one of the strongest
predictors of environmental beliefs. Higher levels of education shows a
positive statistical effect on PB, LCI, LCE, KC and KS. However, higher
levels of education show a negative statistical effect on AOC and FB.
Liberalism shows a positive statistical effect on AOC, FB and PB. Party
identification is predictive of several environmental beliefs. Democrats
are more likely to display a higher AOC, PB and KC. However,
Republicans are more likely to hold KC and KS. Lastly, PM shows a
statistical effect on PB, LCI, LCE, KC and KS.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
My analysis both supports and refutes the previous research.
Examining the change in the pseudo R2 indicates the significant
influence of social psychological variables on behavior and intention.
Moreover, social psychological variables add the most additional variance
to WTS (21%) and the least variance to GG (2%). The median increase in
predicative ability was 10%, which is identical to the findings by Dietz et
al. (1998). For four out of the six equations, adding the social
psychological power more than doubled predictive power, and tripled
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predictive power for two behavioral intention items (WTS and ES). This
indicates the influence of social psychological variables on environmental
behavioral intentions.
Overall, many of the findings are similar to those found in the
Dietz et al. (1998) study in which the social structural variables are not
operating through the social psychological variables.12 This is due to the
social structural patterns remaining the same, although losing a
significant amount of predictive power. However, several of the social
psychological variables - LCI, LCE and KS - gain predictive ability
through the inclusion of social structural variables. In Table 3, LCI gains
predictive ability in CB and PE, and LCE gains predictive ability in WTS.
KS gains predictive ability in SP.
Gender and race are found to be weak predictors of environmental
behavior and intention, with the only statistical effect found among
females who are less likely than males to SP. This differs from the Dietz
et al. (1998) study which found that gender and race maintained several
statistical effects. Females were less likely than males to have a positive
statistical effect on WTS, yet were more likely than males in CB. Race
was found to be predictive of both CB and ES, with blacks more likely
than whites to engage in these behavior and intentions.

12

However, in Table 3, No Religion does gains a statistical effect on ES.
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Likewise, both studies found that females tend to have a higher
AOC in comparison to males, while the Dietz et al. (1998) study also
found a statistical effect with females having higher FB. Additionally, this
study also controlled for KC and KS in which females were less likely
than males to hold these beliefs. For policy decision makers, this fact
shows that methods of education and information should be directed at
women, while males, for example, are more likely to be influenced
through affect and imagery.
In this study blacks were found more likely than whites to hold FB,
yet were less likely than whites to feel that human progress was harming
the environment (PB). These findings followed the results from the Dietz
et al. (1998) study. However, this study additionally found blacks less
likely than whites to feel they can do anything about the environment
(LCI); more likely than whites to feel that everyone must play their role to
do something about the environment (LCE), and less likely than whites to
KC. For policy decision makers, empowering blacks to realize the power
of their decisions to affect the environment, and increasing knowledge of
environmental causes is important to influencing future behavior and
intention. Moreover, the finding that blacks are less likely than whites to
view human progress as more important than the environment supports
the hypothesis that while on a whole blacks may be more concerned
about the environment, there are many other issues that compete for
their resources.
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Age only showed a statistically significant effect on CB in which
individuals age 30-44 (Generation X), were less likely than those age 4565 (Baby Boomers). Dietz et al. (1998) found similar patterns with CB,
and additionally that those < 34 were less likely than those between ages
35-47 to SP and more likely to believe the government should be
spending more money to protect the environment (PE). Additionally, they
found that those individuals > 47 believe the government should be
spending less on the environment (ES) than those age 35-47.
Age did not show any statistical effect on any of the social
psychological variables in this study, yet Dietz et al. (1998) found two
statistical effects. Those aged 47 and older were less likely than those age
35-47 to have a high AOC, and were less likely to view the environment
over human progress (PB). Moreover, the lack of statistical effects on age
and behavior and intention as well as environmental beliefs, suggests
that age has become less significant in determining environmental
beliefs. However, the behavior and intentions which are most age specific
continue to be CB.
Income, which was not controlled for in the Dietz et al. (1998)
study, show no statistical effect on any of the behavior and intention
variables. However, income was a strong predictor of environmental
beliefs. Those individuals below the median income were more likely that
those above median income to have a high AOC; more likely to hold FB;
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yet, less likely to feel that there is anything they can do about the
environment (LCI). These statistical effects indicate that what while below
income individuals have stronger environmental beliefs, they lack the
feeling of knowing there is something they can do to help the
environment. Similar to the findings with race, in which blacks showed a
higher concern for the environment, but lack of feeling there is anything
they can do, policy decision-makers should direct strategies which focus
on the underlying values and beliefs that orientate individuals toward
increased LCI.
Education shows a positive statistical effect on WTS and SP, in
which the more educated are more willing to engage in these behavior
and intentions. Dietz et al. (1998) found education to show a statistical
effect on WTS, SP, and GG. Likewise, in this study education was found
to be one of the strongest predictors of environmental beliefs. The more
educated were more likely to view the environment over human progress
(PB); more likely to have a strong internal (LCI) and external locus of
control (LCE); and more likely to KC and KS. However, education showed
a negative statistical effect on AOC and FB. These results share some
consistency with the Dietz et al. (1998) study which found that education
showed a negative statistical effect on FB.
This proves that education is a far better predictor of
environmental beliefs than it is of environmental behaviors and
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intention. Moreover, the consistency between studies that more years of
education equates to more concern about the environment is muddled by
the negative statistical effects on AOC and FB.
Liberalism only showed a statistical effect SP and GG – both
political behaviors. In Dietz et al (1998), liberalism was significantly more
predictive of behavior and intentions, in which the more liberal showed
positive statistical effects on all behavior and intention items. Thus, the
decrease in these statistical effects shows the decline in political ideology
in determining behavioral intentions and most past behaviors. In both
this study and Dietz et al. (1998), liberalism was a strong predictor of
environmental beliefs. Likewise, liberalism showed a positive statistical
effect on AOC, FB and PB. In Dietz et al. (1998), a similar pattern was
found with liberalism showing a positive statistical effect on AOC and PB.
Religion was a poor predictor of environmental behavior and
intentions as well as environmental beliefs. The only statistical effect was
that Catholics were more likely than Protestants to engage in CB.
Likewise, it was found that Catholics hold FB higher in comparison to
Protestants. Similarly, the Dietz et al. (1998) study found Catholics more
likely to engage in CB and more likely to SP then Fundamentalists.
Additionally, their study found Catholics, moderate and liberal

58

Protestants, and those with no religion to be more likely than
Fundamentalists to hold PB.13
Lastly, PM shows a statistical effect on SP and PE, where those
who identified with PM values were more likely to SP and more likely to
believe people/business should decide for themselves how to protect the
environment (PE). In Dietz et al. (1998), PM shows a statistical effect on
WTS, CB and SP where those who identified with PM values were more
likely to engage in these behavior and intentions.
PM was also a strong predictor of environmental beliefs in this
study. Those who identified with PM values were more likely to hold a
LCI, LCE, KC and KS. Dietz et al. (1998) found that those who identified
as PM were less likely to hold FB, but not PB.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this thesis provides new insights into the
literature on environmentalism as well as on perceptions of risk and
communication strategy. This study indicates that when determining
what influences environmental behavior and intentions as well as
environmental beliefs, social psychological variables remain the strongest
predictors. As such, this conclusion is supported by the findings of Dietz
13

In the Dietz et al. (1998) study, religious sect was analyzed through the following
categories: Fundamentalist, Moderate Protestant, Liberal Protestant, Catholic and No
Affiliation.
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et al. (1998), and further suggests that many of the social-structural
effects that existed in their study are overshadowed by the social
psychological variables.
None the less, this study finds supports the conclusions in Dietz et
al. (1998), which suggests data sets of this size should include more
measures of attitude, belief and worldview variables. These include the
worldview orienting dispositions measured in cultural theory; moral
norm activation; risk perception; and affect and imagery. Research from
Lesierowitz (2006), Peters & Slovic (1996), and Dake (1991,1992) have
included appropriate scales examining perceptions of risk and affect and
imagery. These scales will provide more accuracy and context in how
social psychological variables operate, thus influencing behavior.

Additionally, the significance that social psychological factors play
in a person’s attitudes, intentions and behavior towards the environment
leads back to the psychological and cultural underpinnings of risk
perception. This analysis provides context into the values and beliefs that
guide individual concern for the environment and the subsequent
behaviors and intentions with which they correspond.
As it was previously mentioned, some experts have argued that the
public should be removed from the risk regulating process entirely.
However, regulating risks requires the cooperation of a collective body of
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lay people. Likewise, as cultural theory has established, people tend to
evaluate risks as members of a community. The research on risks
described in this essay has had an overwhelming tendency to avoid the
experimental context of risk - that is, actual people considering real
threats to their well-being or other peoples' well being. Laboratory
experiments of cognitive psychologists represent risk perception within
the bounded rationality of experts. As a result, these models reveal more
about the cognitive context of the research rather than about how a
person constructs and experiences risk in a social context (Dake, 1992).
Understanding how the public views risks requires understanding the
social context of the values and beliefs they place on these issues.
Therefore, the public must be a part of the risk regulation process, and
as such, organizations and professionals must engage in more effective
and efficient risk communication strategies acknowledging these
cognitive and cultural perceptions.
Therefore, the risk communication process must not focus only the
content of the message, but also the overall process of how risks are
communicated to the public. As O'Leary et al. (1990) state in their
chapter on risk communication in "Managing the Environment:
Understanding the Legal, Organizational and Policy Challenges," there
are four elements of the risk communication process that managers need
to understand: the source of the message; the design of the message; the
delivery channel; and the target recipients.
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While government agencies and industry are the common sources
of risk communication messages, many other groups, including
environmental advocates, communication groups, and the media play
important roles. Now, these sources are even more prominent in the age
of technology, where information is more available to anyone who seeks
it. Therefore, each of these groups represents a different dimensionality
to the complexity of the risk decision-making process. Moreover, it
underscores the necessity of approaching risk problems through a
platform that is sustainable and adaptable to the complexities that these
issues present. As the public perceives each of these channels of risk
communication differently, it is important that public organizations
continue to build public trust, specifically through transparency. This
involves understanding how their own values and beliefs align with the
public as well as understanding the cognitive rationality of the public
they look to inform. As such, these organizations must cooperate in
defining how the message is formulated.
Experts must balance how to take highly technical, quantitative
analysis and put it in terms that are understood by the lay public. The
findings of this analysis suggest that understanding individual behavior
and intention as well as environmental beliefs is largely based on social
psychological characteristics. Essentially, the design of the message
becomes a process of understanding the cognitive psychological
literature that explains how individuals filter complex information to
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make quick decisions, but also the cultural rationality that exists in the
community where the risk is to be communicated and the values and
beliefs that enable citizens to see their side of the problem. To know how
to solve social problems, it becomes essential to understand the society
in which you look to influence.
As such, the delivery channel of the information must take into
account the social, political, and economic context in which the risk
information is conveyed. This has several implications: how are
individuals likely to perceive the source of the message? Who are the
leaders within the community that influence public opinion? Which
institutions are most likely to have credibility in communicating these
risks? Which media sources does the community rely on? This involves
the ability tounderstand the many different dimensions that influence
how the public perceives environmental risk as well as understanding
through what means that message can be conveyed.
Therefore, the objective of risk communication must be two-ways.
Risk communication is not about enabling the public to see rationality
through the expert’s view, but a deeper understanding of the values and
preferences of the community. Moreover, this is also a call to individuals
to continue to challenge what they perceive, value and believe and
continue to question their assumptions. Therefore, risk communication
is a participatory process. Viewing the public as partners in the risk
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communication process will enhance public participation in the political
and social discourse in how to effectively make decisions about collective
risk.
Additionally, Congress and the laws and policies which it enacts
must require legislation, rules and regulations to be consistent with the
reality of environmental protection in an imperfect world. A set of rules
crafted to fit one set of socio-ecological conditions can erode as social,
economic and technological developments increase the potential for
human damage to the ecosystems and even the biosphere itself. Thus,
successful commons governance requires that rules evolve (Dietz et al.,
2003). Policy decision-making must not confine itself to any one-size-fitsall approach. The process should be a continued effort to evolve around
the complexity of the public mindset.

Therefore, the way to cope with such massive problems continues
to follow the edict: think globally, but act locally. Global thinking in
present terms may raise some of the central questions of risk
management: how to reconcile technological systems with social values;
how to develop the consensus about potentially dangerous technologies
that is necessary for potential growth; and how to establish and maintain
trust in our protective institutions. Moreover, it guides our idea about
the way we want to live in this society. Therefore, the continued most
effective way for our society to learn how to cope with risk is to enable
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locally based risk management endeavors. This will inevitably change
how the public must balance risks against the local economic impact of
controlling them, and involve the local public in a meaningful way in the
decision-making process. Most importantly, it will develop trust through
an increase in social capital, which occurs when communities maintain
frequent communication and dense social networks (Dietz et al., 2003).
This process involves acknowledging our own individual beliefs and
values, while being cognizant of how we perceive the risks we face and
seeking to understand others.

Understanding who fears what and why, and how to influence
behavioral change and intention is a process that involves a continued
understanding in not only human cognition, but also in the deeply
embedded values we share as social beings. This empirical analysis
sought to further develop how our values and beliefs about the
environment shape our behavior and intentions, and to what extent
these values and beliefs differ within social groups. The findings that it
presents further underscore the conclusion of Dietz et al. (1998) that our
attitudes, intentions and behavior operate primarily through social
psychological constructs. Moreover, comparing the results from these
studies, which expand over 17 years, indicate the influence that social
psychological variables have taken over common social structural
groupings. Additionally, this may suggest the divergence of common
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social structural groups into more dynamic, complex groupings. Our
tendency as individuals to process certain information and disregard
other, and to find great difficulty in balancing our subjective process of
reason and gut reaction, facts and feelings, has lead to our society
producing fears in light of the facts. Effective risk regulation requires all
sectors of society and the public to not only become more aware of the
biases we face as individuals, but develop collective solutions to mutually
defined risks. Understanding the environmental risks our society faces
will continue to be a difficult question to answer given the difficulty in
understanding the individual balance of emotion and cognition as well as
the deeply imbedded social values and beliefs which orientate our
decisions. Answers to complex policy issues such as managing
environmental risks should not seek to be right or wrong, but instead
should center on trade-offs around what we value as individuals and as
groups. While perfect decisions are not the goal, we can continue to
strive to better understand the values we share collectively, and in the
process better understand ourselves and others.
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APPENDIX I.
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES

Awareness of Consequences Index
In general, do you think that a rise in the world's temperature caused by
climate change is…
In general, do you think that air pollution caused by cars is…
In general, do you think that nuclear power stations are…
In general, do you think that air pollution caused by industry is…
In general, do you think that pesticides and chemicals used in farming are…
In general, do you think that pollution of America's rivers, lakes, and streams
is…
Scale range from 1 (not dangerous at all for the environment) to 5 (extremely
dangerous for the environment)

Progress versus the Environment Index
People worry too much about human progress harming the environment.
We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about
prices and jobs today.
Scale range from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree)

Fragility of Nature Index
Almost everything we do in modern life harms the environment.
Economic growth always harms the environment.
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

Mean
3.66

S.D.
0.69

Alpha if item deleted Alpha
0.81

3.44
3.53
3.40
3.89

1.14
0.89
1.13
0.85

0.71
0.79
0.57
0.84

1304
1362
1311
1369

3.65

0.90

0.72

1354

3.96

0.88

0.71

1368

Mean
2.95

S.D.
1.19

3.04

1.05

0.85

1349

2.95

1.19

0.85

1373

Mean
2.87
3.23
2.52

S.D.
0.79
1.03
0.88

Alpha if item deleted Alpha
0.62

Alpha if item deleted Alpha
0.52
0.83
0.81

Postmaterialism
What do you think should be America's highest priority, the most important thing it
should do? Second most important thing it should do?
Scale range from 0 (none of America's priorities should be postmaterialistic values) to
3 (America's highest priorities should be postmaterialistic values)

Locus of Control (Internal)
It is just too difficult for someone like me to do much about the environment.
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

N
1216

N
1373

N
1328
1360
1341

Mean

S.D.

N

1.52

0.999

1166

Mean

S.D.

N

3.25

1.21

1362

Mean

S.D.

N

3.43

1.13

1379

Mean

S.D.

N

2.52

1.02

1357

Mean

S.D.

N

2.94

1.07

1359

Locus of Control (External)
There is no point in doing what I can for the environment unless others do the same.
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

Know Solution
How much do you feel you know about the solutions to environmental problems?
Scale range from 1 (know nothing at all) to 5 (know a great deal)

Know Cause
How much do you feel you know about the causes of environmental problems?
Scale range from 1 ( know nothing at all) to 5 (know a great deal)
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APPENDIX II.
BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS

Consumer Behavior Index
How often do you make a special effort to sort glass or cans or plastic or papers for
recycling?
How often do you make a special effort to buy fruits or vegetables grown without
pesticides or chemicals?
How often do you cut back on driving for environmental reasons?
How often do you reduce the energy or fuel you use at home for environmental
reasons?
How often do you choose to save or re-use water for environmental reasons?
How often do you avoid buying certain products for environmental reasons?
Scale range from 1 (never) to 4 (always)

Willingness to Sacrifice Index
How willing would you be to much higher prices in order to protect the environment?
How willing would you be to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the
environment?
How willing would you be to accept cuts in your standard of living in order to protect
the environment?
Scale range from 1 (not at all willing) to 5 (very willing)

Mean
2.19

S.D.
0.65

Alpha if item deleted

Alpha
0.77

2.90

1.08

0.53

1373

2.15
1.80

0.98
0.87

0.66
0.72

1364
1303

2.28
1.90
2.10

0.98
0.96
0.91

0.74
0.66
0.73

1395
1397
1385

Mean
2.84

S.D.
1.08

Alpha if item deleted

3.08

1.22

0.86

1343

2.68

1.28

0.88

1350

2.73

1.26

0.81

1354

Alpha
0.84

N
1252

N
1302

Mean

S.D.

N

0.17

0.37

1381

Mean

S.D.

N

0.06

0.23

1400

Mean

S.D.

N

0.75

0.35

984

Mean

S.D.

N

2.45

0.71

976

Sign Petition
In the last five years, have you signed a petition about an environmental issue?
Scale range from 0 (no) to 1 (yes)

Member of Group
Are you a member of any group whose aim is to preserve or protect the
environment?
Scale range from 0 (no) to 1 (yes)

Protect the Environment
Government should let (people/business) decide for themselves how to protect
the environment, even if it means they don’t always do the right thing, or
governemnt should pass laws to make (people/business) protect the
environment, even if it interferes with (people/business) right to make their own
decisions?
Scale range from 0 (government should let (people/business) decide) to 1
(government should pass laws)

Environmental Spending
Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount on
improving or protecting the environment?
Scale range from 1 (too much) to 3 (too little)
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APPENDIX III.
SOCIAL STRUCTURAL VARIABLES
Gender
Male
Female

Race
Black
White

Education
Scale range from 0-20 years

Age
Baby Boomers (45-65)
Generation X (30-44)
Generation Y (< 30)

Income
Above Median Income
Below Median Income
Median income recorded was $50,000

Mean

S.D.

N

0.44
0.56

0.50
0.50

2014
2014

Mean

S.D.

N

0.17
0.83

0.37
0.37

1861
1861

Mean
13.45

S.D.
3.14

N
2009

Mean

S.D.

N

0.45
0.33
0.22

0.50
0.47
0.42

1651
1651
1651

Mean

S.D.

N

0.51
0.49

0.50
0.50

2014
2014

Mean

S.D.

N

Religion & Spirituality
Protestant
Catholic
No Religion
1
Religious Strength

0.54
0.27
0.2

0.50
0.44
0.40

1818
1818
1818

1.92

1.08

1933

Spiritual Person2

2.14

0.96

1933

Mean

S.D.

N

0.66
0.18

1.03
0.39

1979
1979

1.01

1.18

1979

Mean

S.D.

N

3.92

1.46

1944

1

Scale range from 1 (somewhat strong) to 3 (strong)

2

Scale range from 1 (not spiritual at all) to 4 (very spiritual)

Party Identification
Republican1
Independent
Democrat1
1
Scale range from 1 (Independent, close to (Democrat/Republican)) to 3 (strong
(Democrat/Republican))
Political Ideology
Liberalism
Scale range from 1 (very conservative) to 7 (extremly liberal)
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